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Abstract: The paper spells out the rationale for developing means of manipulating and of 
measuring people’s sense of commitment to robot interaction partners. A sense of 
commitment may lead people to be patient when a robot is not working smoothly, to remain 
vigilant when a robot is working so smoothly that a task becomes boring, and to increase 
their willingness to invest effort in teaching a robot. We identify a range of contexts in which 
a sense of commitment to robot interaction partners may be particularly important. 
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Feeling Committed to a Robot 
1.Why? 
  
As robots become increasingly prevalent in many domains of everyday life, from disaster 
relief to health care, education, and manufacturing [1,2,3,4,5], we can expect more and more 
research to be devoted to the optimization of human-robot-interaction. In this regard, it will 
be important not only to continuously improve safety and efficiency, but also to develop 
ways of making people feel comfortable and motivated to interact with robots.  
            While the primary focus of research in this context has been on identifying features of 
robots' appearance and behaviour which enhance their likeability [6,7,8,9,10,11,12], 
researchers have also explored other means of sustaining people's willingness to interact with 
robots. In particular, the concept of trust has received considerable attention in the field of 
social robotics in recent years [13,14,15]. It is easy to see why: trust is an important 
stabilizing force in relationships and in joint actions [16, 17]). And indeed, in some of the 
contexts in which people will be interacting with robots in the coming years, it could be 
greatly important that trust can be established and maintained. In healthcare, for example, it 
would be advantageous for people to be willing to rely on information or advice provided by 
a robot (such as doctor or a nurse), and to be comfortable divulging personal information to a 
robot without fearing that it will be handled without the appropriate care [18]. 
But, while trust is clearly a useful concept for social roboticists, it also has an 
important limitation. Specifically, trust helps only indirectly to sustain agents' motivation to 
contribute to joint action -- i.e., it stabilizes one agent's expectation that her partner will 
continue contributing to the joint action in a cooperative manner, and thereby reduces a 
source of uncertainty which could undermine the first agent's motivation to contribute. But it 
does not directly explain why that first agent would then herself contribute to the joint action 
in a cooperative manner. Indeed, she might be distracted or tempted to disengage irrespective 
of her level of trust in her partner.   
            In this brief opinion piece, we introduce a concept which is complementary to that of 
trust, and which overcomes the aforementioned limitation of trust: the sense of commitment. 
Our aim is to make the case that the concept of a sense of commitment may provide 
roboticists with a useful guide to developing effective, low-cost tools for designing robots 
that elicit patience and persistence and sustained motivation on the part of human 
interactants. We begin by briefly introducing the concept of a sense of commitment, 
distinguishing it from the concept of trust and explaining how it can be operationalized 
(Section 2: What?). We then identify a range of contexts in which the sense of commitment 
may be particularly important in human-robot interaction (Section 3: When?). Finally, we 
discuss possibilities for designing social robots which elicit a sense of commitment on the 
part of human users (Section 4: How?). 
  
  
2. What? 
  
  
The concept of a sense of commitment is closely related to the concept of trust, insofar as 
both refer to psychological mechanisms that help to sustain agents' motivation to contribute 
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to joint action [19]. Unlike trust, however, the sense of commitment is linked directly to 
motivation. [20] hypothesize the sense of commitment as a mechanism which stabilizes 
agents' motivation to contribute to joint actions (and more generally to others' goals), leading 
them to persist and to remain focused in the face of tempting alternative options and 
distractions.  
To illustrate the phenomenon we are focusing on here, consider the following 
example: Giuliana is an engineer working for a company that produces widgets. As it 
happens, she is also a highly skilled programmer, and sometimes helps colleagues out with IT 
issues, although this is not strictly speaking part of her job. On one occasion, just as she is 
about to head home for the day, she notices that her colleague Sam is struggling to complete 
his project on time because the computers at the office are running an outdated software 
program. She is the only person around with the requisite competence to resolve the issue, 
but it may take her considerable time to do so. Giuliana has no explicit commitment to help, 
but she may very well feel a sense of commitment to helping her colleague finish his task on 
time. And this sense of commitment may be enhanced by various situational factors: e.g. if 
Sam has already put a great deal of effort into the task, if she has helped him in the past with 
similar tasks and thereby created an expectation that she can be relied upon, etc.  Such cases 
are highly common in everyday life, and it is important to be able to identify, prioritize, keep 
track of, and respond appropriately to our own and others’ commitments in cases like that of 
Giuliana. 
It is important to emphasize that there are a number of crucial differences between 
this psychological concept (the sense of commitment) and the normative concept of 
commitment. The normative concept refers to a relation among two agents and an action X, 
such that one agent has an obligation to some other agent to do X because she has 
intentionally expressed her willingness to do X under conditions of common knowledge, and 
this has been acknowledged [21,22,23,24,25]). The example of Giuliana helps to illustrate 
these differences. First, the sense of commitment can come in varying degrees -- i.e., it is a 
graded, not a binary, phenomenon. This is in contrast to the way in which theorists typically 
think about the normative concept of commitment -- i.e. as a relation which either obtains or 
does not. Second, whereas normative commitments are taken on intentionally (i.e. one 
deliberately makes a promise or gives an assurance because one is willing to take on the 
obligations which this implies), one may come to feel a sense of commitment to perform or 
continue performing a joint action without ever having intended to take on an obligation to do 
so. Third, whereas the normative concept of commitment requires that one actually believe 
that one has taken on certain obligations, the sense of commitment can be decoupled from 
beliefs about obligations -- i.e. one may feel a sense of commitment to performing a joint 
action even if one does not consciously believe that one has a commitment to doing so. In the 
example above, Giuliana may not believe that she is under any obligation to help, but she 
may nevertheless feel a sense of commitment which in fact leads her to do so. Indeed, she 
may feel committed even if she did not believe that she had any obligations at all with respect 
to Sam, e.g. because Sam were a robot.  
These three features make it possible to operationalize the sense of commitment in 
terms of agents’ motivation to perform actions. They also highlight the possibility that this 
motivation can be modulated by cues that one's partner values the joint action and may be 
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relying on one to make one's contribution [20]. On this basis, recent research has begun to 
investigate the cues and situational factors that may trigger/modulate such a sense of 
commitment. One recent study [26], for example, revealed evidence that a high degree of 
spatiotemporal coordination within joint action (i.e. the two agents form a chain in cleaning 
up a pile of sand, with one agent scooping and the other pouring) can engender a greater 
sense of commitment than would be present if there were only a low degree of spatiotemporal 
coordination (i.e. the same two agents do not form a chain but, rather, work in parallel). This 
leads observers of the joint action to expect both agents to remain engaged in the joint action 
for a longer time and to be more likely to persist until the goal is achieved. Similarly, it has 
been [19] demonstrated that coordinated decision-making is sufficient to elicit a sense of 
commitment, leading agents to resist tempting alternatives and thereby contribute to 
sustaining cooperation through fluctuations in individuals’ interests (Cf. [27], [28]). In a 
related strand of research, one recent study [29] found evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that the perception of a partner’s effort elicits a sense of commitment to joint action, leading 
to increased persistence in the face of a temptation to disengage (see also [30]).  
Of course many other factors may also give rise to or enhance a sense of commitment: 
in general, we may expect that one’s sense of commitment can be modulated by any cue that 
another agent expects one to perform a particular action, by the knowledge that one has led 
them to form that expectation, by the knowledge that they are relying on that expectation, 
and/or by the expectation of reciprocity from the other party [20]. 
Building upon this recent research investigating situational cues that can elicit a sense 
of commitment in human-human joint action, we propose that some of the very same 
situational cues could be implemented in HRI. In the next section, we survey a broad range of 
contexts in which this could be particularly useful. 
  
  
3. When? 
 
 
In what contexts might a sense of commitment towards performing a task with a robot be 
particularly beneficial? We suggest that this would be particularly useful in any contexts in 
which there is a risk that a human interactant may partially or fully disengage from a task that 
s/he is performing together with a robot partner, and when this is likely to have undesirable 
consequences. In this section, we will survey a range of situations in which the risk of 
disengagement is particularly high, and discuss the kinds of undesirable consequences which 
may be expected in such situations.  
In general, human disengagement may be an acute risk either because a robot is 
performing poorly (i.e. because the robot makes errors, performs more slowly than a human 
expects or is accustomed to, needs to stop and recalibrate, etc.) or indeed because it is 
performing so well that the human ceases to pay close attention to the task. Of course, there 
are a great many further factors which may lead people to become distracted or disengage 
from a task; in the following, we will focus on robot underperformance and robot 
overperformance because we believe that these two factors have been neglected in the 
literature. Let us first consider the former type of case: human disengagement in response to 
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robot underperformance. We will then turn our attention to the threat of disengagement 
arising in response to overperformance.  
Disengagement arising in response to underperformance is familiar to anyone who 
has struggled to remain patient as her laptop loaded slowly, or had to exercise self-control to 
refrain from smashing a phone that deleted an important picture or email. There are at least 
four reasons why roboticists may be particularly concerned about people’s reactions to robot 
underperformance. First, robot underperformance is likely to be frequent, at least in the 
medium term. Dynamic, real-world scenarios will put strains on robots’ capabilities, 
especially in more complex joint actions that unfold over longer time periods and involve 
shifting goals and strategies. Secondly, people may in general have unrealistically high 
expectations about the capabilities of robots (especially those with a more human-like 
appearance), and therefore perceive robots to be underperforming even when this is not the 
case. In one study [31] for instance, it was shown that people judge a robot to be more 
capable when that robot is able to perform conversational speech. This implies that there is 
more room for disappointment when a robot appears human-like and thereby raises the 
expectation of a smooth and effective interaction. Interestingly, [31] also showed that people 
felt robots with conversational speech were less capable after a failure than robots who did 
not have such conversational functionality. Thirdly, there is a further reason why people may 
incorrectly perceive robots to be underperforming -- i.e. people are typically unfamiliar with 
the workings of robots, and may sometimes misjudge that a robot has broken down when in 
fact it is taking longer to perform an action than expected simply because it is recalibrating or 
exploring the learning space [32]. Fourth, there may be important negative consequences of 
human disengagement in response to (perceived) robot underperformance.  
The negative consequences of human disengagement may range from opportunity 
costs (e.g. the human decides to go to a different shop or service provider where s/he can 
interact with a reason person), to subpar productivity in industry settings involving human-
robot interaction, to health and safety risks if the human interactant ceases to pay attention to 
the task in a potentially dangerous environment.  
  Of course, being able to create robots to whom people feel committed will be useful 
in the same situations in which having a sense of commitment to a human would be useful. 
This is especially true in situations where the interaction has a high-reward on success/ high-
damage on failure payoff structure. Consider the example of a doctor-patient relationship. If I 
break my leg and am told by a doctor that I need to follow a course of physiotherapy, a sense 
of commitment towards that doctor (or towards my teammates if I am an athlete) might lead 
me to persist on course with this process even when it became difficult or tedious. If I had no 
sense of commitment towards the doctor (or to my teammates), then I might skip 
physiotherapy sessions or perform careless actions that risk further injury [33]. Given the 
increase in the use of robots in hospitals and care homes [34, 35, 36], being able to create 
robots that are able to emulate and elicit this kind of commitment will play a significant part 
in the successful integration of robotics platforms into the healthcare services.  
Finally, in the service industry, having customers that feel a sense of commitment to a 
service robot will also be of considerable benefit. This is illustrated by the following 
example. Jack goes into a clothes shop and is greeted by a service robot who asks him what 
he is looking for. Once Jack has told the robot that he is looking for a new sweater, the robot 
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leads Jack to the appropriate section and reaches for the desired item on the top shelf (beyond 
Jack’s reach) where it knows these sweaters are kept. However, the sweaters have since been 
moved across the shelf by a member of staff. The robot had not registered this and has to 
reassess the environment and search for the new location of the sweaters. This leads to a 
delay. Since Jack can see where the sweaters have been moved to, he may become impatient 
and frustrated, and consider switching to a different shop with human assistants. Of course, 
this situation is potentially damaging for the reputation of the robot and for the reputation of 
the shop. If the robot had performed its action in such a way as to establish a sense of 
commitment between itself and Jack, however, Jack may have resisted the temptation to 
disengage and seek human help, thus mitigating the damage to the reputation of the store’s 
quality of service.  
It should be acknowledged that error-prone robots may also be endearing and evoke 
empathy in virtue of their errors, leading to increased patience on the part of human 
interactants. In fact, there is evidence pointing in this direction from one study [10] showing 
that participants actually favoured robots who made mistakes, as this made them more 
human-like. However, the point stands that many customers in a retail scenario may be more 
impatient and more demanding when they are shopping for something than when they are 
interacting with a robot in an experimental scenario. 
Let us now consider a different type of case: human disengagement in response to 
robot overperformance. While we are not aware of any research directly investigating this 
possibility in the context of human-robot interaction, there has been relevant research in the 
context of human reliance on automated systems [37]. For example, it has been shown that 
pilots’ excessive trust in or overreliance on autopilot systems can lead to dangerous 
monitoring failures [38]. Similarly, many road vehicles already contain computational 
systems that take control away from the driver in order to limit the inconveniences of driving 
(cruise control, automatic parking and so on). However, many of these systems still require 
that the human driver take back control in situations where the system is incapable of making 
safe decisions by itself. Take the case of cruise control in the following example. Claire is 
driving her car on a long trip across the country. Whilst on a long motorway stretch she 
switches on advanced cruise control and takes her hands off the steering wheel and her foot 
off the accelerator. She knows from experience that the car is able to slow down when 
appropriate and to modulate its speed effectively. The robotic system is performing its action 
so well that Claire loses her focus and neglects her own part of the joint action: namely, 
staying alert to any sudden changes in the environment (a child walking out into the road for 
example) that would require her to take control of the wheel and to brake or turn to avoid 
disaster. In this situation, had Claire been committed to the task with her robotic partner, she 
may have resisted the temptation to relax and to daydream, and remained engaged in the task 
at hand. This example generalises to other contexts where one’s losing focus on a joint action 
due to overestimation of a robot’s capabilities may entail a high risk. A human agent’s lack of 
commitment to a joint task in a factory with a robot partner might lead that human to become 
uninterested or to lose focus [39]. In certain industrial contexts, this holds risks relating to 
potential injury to the person or damage to the robot, especially since workers are 
increasingly working in closer contact with their robot partners [40,41]. If, on the other hand, 
the human feels a sense of commitment towards the task it is performing with a robot partner, 
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she may remain engaged in that task, thereby limiting the extent to which such injuries or 
damage might come about. 
We would speculate that monitoring failures arising in response to robot 
overperformance may be particularly likely to occur in human-robot interaction settings in 
which a human’s task is monotonous and/or where the human must be vigilant to pick up on 
infrequent events. It is known, for example, that the more infrequent an event is to which a 
human must react, the more likely it is that mistakes will occur [42,43,44]. This may be a 
particularly likely and dangerous possibility in factory contexts. If it is possible for humans to 
sustain their attention to such tasks by eliciting a sense of commitment, this could have 
important positive consequences. 
Might there also be risks in designing robots to elicit a sense of commitment on the 
part of human interactants? Some recent research motivates the conjecture that a sense of 
commitment in joint action can lead agents to comply more readily with their partner's 
antisocial requests, e.g. to put sow bugs into the coffee grinder, or to produce annoying 
sounds to distract a competitor. Similar phenomena have also been observed in human-robot 
interaction: one study [45] indicated that human participants were more inclined to comply 
with a robot's request to throw books into a rubbish bin when the robot was physically present 
than when the robot was merely telepresent. Another recent study [46] found that participants 
followed a robot during a fire evacuation procedure even when they had observed that same 
robot making errors in a navigation task just before the evacuation happened. These findings 
motivate the conjecture that increasing a human’s sense of commitment to an interaction with 
a robot could under some circumstances lead the human to be willing to perform actions that 
are not in her/his best interests. This risk could be especially serious in military or rescue 
contexts if humans were led to endanger themselves or others out of a sense of commitment 
to a robot interactant.  
  In this section, we have specified a range of contexts in which it would be useful – or 
dangerous – to be able to elicit a human's sense of commitment to performing a task together 
with a robot partner (See Table 1). In the next section, we turn to the question of how this 
may be achieved. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
4. How? 
  
  
It is obviously important to understand how a sense of commitment might be triggered and 
modulated in human-robot interactions. In this section, we outline a number of ways in which 
this may be possible. Here we draw both on data that we have already collected, and also 
point to potential answers to this question from other strands of research from neuroscience, 
computing science, and robotics.  
Of course, the most straightforward possibility is to use explicit verbal 
communication. For example, the robot could indicate what it expects a human to do and/or 
make explicit that it is relying on the human to perform a particular contribution. More 
indirectly, it could express its gratitude at the human’s contribution and thereby reinforce the 
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human’s commitment, or indicate its conditional willingness to reciprocate in the future. 
Turning to the other side of the interaction, a robot could elicit an assurance from a human: 
just having made a promise or an agreement with a robot could lead a human to feel more 
committed to performing her contribution.  
While we often make commitments explicitly, through the use of contracts or spoken 
promises for instance, it is likely that one way in which a sense of commitment might be 
communicated is through implicit forms of communication, often referred to as social signals. 
Social signals constitute a range of behaviours: from changes in posture [47, 48, 49], and 
gaze [50, 51] to changes in the non-verbal elements of an interactor’s speech [52, 53] and are 
known to communicate a large amount of information about the agents involved in an 
interaction including their emotions, social status, and likely future behaviors (see [54, 55] for 
review). But what kinds of implicit communicative behaviours or social signals might be 
used to communicate that a person or a robot is committed to a joint task?  
  One answer to this question is provided by [29, 56]. In one recent study [29], 
participants played a joint version of the classic snake game where over 20 rounds they were 
to collect as many apples as possible with a partner. Within each round the apples appeared at 
an increasingly slow rate diminishing the value and increasing the tedium over time. Before 
each round participants observed what they believed to be a human partner (but was actually 
a computer algorithm) complete either a short, easy captcha or a longer, more difficult one in 
order to unlock the round that would follow. The data showed that participants spent 
significantly longer playing the rounds following the longer captchas. A recent study [56] 
extends this research to the realm of human-robot interaction, showing the same effect when 
participants were led to believe that they were playing the same game with the humanoid 
robot iCub [57]. This finding indicates that the perception of a robot partner’s apparent 
investment of cognitive effort might be one important social signal that could be used to 
trigger commitment to a given task.  
  But what other ways might a sense of commitment be communicated? An obvious 
alternative to cognitive effort is physical effort, where the latter is understood to be the 
expending of physical energy through movement. Perhaps then commitment could be 
communicated through the way we move. This suggestion is motivated by research on 
intention communication in human-human interaction. In the last 30 years human 
neuroscience research has shown that our intentions have noticeable effects on our 
movements [58, 59, 60, 61]. In one study [60], it was shown that the velocity and orientation 
of our hands during a reach to grasp movement towards a bottle of water will vary as a 
function of whether we intend to lift it or to pour it. Other recent studies [62, 63, 64] have 
extended this research to show that these subtle changes in the kinematics of our movements 
extend to reflect social intentions such as when we pass an object in a competitive or 
cooperative scenario. Significantly, one study [64] showed that our perceptual systems are 
acute enough to pick up on these differences when the actions in question are performed by a 
social partner. Participants were able to distinguish between the goals of two visually 
truncated movements that only differed with respect to their kinematics.  
  One might contest here that this evidence does not directly show that humans are 
sensitive in the same ways to the movements of robots. However, a number of studies [65, 
66, 67] show that adults and children are able to ascribe emotional states to robots that match 
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the intended emotional state programmed into the robots by the experimenters. Further, it has 
also been shown [68, 69, 70] that we are able to predict which part of a scene a robot is 
attending to, and also [71, 72] that we are able to accurately assess a robot’s workload (i.e. 
how heavy an item that it is lifting is based on its kinematics). Taken together, this evidence 
gives us good reason to expect that commitment to a task might be communicated in a similar 
fashion. For example, it might be clear to a person that a robot is committed to a task when 
that robot trades effort (as energy expenditure) for gains in movement legibility or 
predictability. This could be done by choosing an end-effector trajectory that makes it clear to 
the human what the goal location of that movement will be as opposed to one that is more 
efficient but less communicative (a rectilinear as opposed to a curvilinear path, for example) 
(for a computational model of such communicative movements see [73]). Indeed the 
modulation of commitment via increased spatio-temporal coordination [26] could be 
explained by each person's perceiving that their partner was investing increased physical 
effort into the task at hand. Thus, we propose that a worthy avenue for future research would 
be to investigate how changes in movement styles may be sufficient to communicate that one 
is committed to the task at hand, and also to trigger and modulate a sense of commitment in 
one’s partner. 
There are a number of potential problems with wanting to implement commitment 
functionality into a robot from the perspective of robotics and computing science given that 
an important goal in these fields (at least in social signal processing) is to utilize research in 
the cognitive neurosciences and apply it to the development of robotic platforms that are 
designed to act alongside humans. For cognitive effort, for instance, one might feasibly take 
some measure of an interactor’s cognitive load over the course of a task. This is because an 
increase in one’s cognitive effort should presuppose an increase in cognitive load. This 
presents a complication because one of the principal ways in which cognitive load is 
measured is through pupillometry [74, 75, 76, 77], which is a difficult variable to measure in 
conditions that are not very tightly controlled. This means that in everyday situations where 
robots will be interacting with humans in changing lighting conditions and with a large 
numbers of distractors it will be not be clear that the changes in pupil diameter that might be 
observed by a robot would reliably indicate a change in cognitive load. 
Investigating how a sense of commitment can be communicated through low-level 
features of our movements, on the other hand, has the advantage of being more plausibly 
implemented. Detecting commitment as a function of physical effort would rely on the 
extraction of kinematic features of a partner’s movement, such as their pose, effector 
trajectories, effector velocities and so on. There already exists a wealth of computational 
methods for extracting this kind of data using video analysis techniques [78, 79] (for review 
see [80]) with recent work using deep neural networks even going so far as to be able to 
accurately estimate the pose and movements of humans in busy and dynamic natural 
environments [81].  
 
  
5. Conclusions and Further Directions 
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We have attempted to make the case that the concept of a sense of commitment may provide 
roboticists with a useful guide to designing and developing effective robots that elicit 
patience and persistence and sustained motivation on the part of human interactants. We have 
argued that such a sense of commitment may be particularly useful in contexts in which a 
human interactant is likely to disengage -- because her robot partner makes mistakes, because 
it performs slowly (while learning or recalibrating), or because it is performing so well that 
the human loses focus. Finally, we have identified a set of tools that may be used to 
implement design features for robots in different contexts to enable them to elicit a sense of 
commitment on the part of a human partner.  
If we are right in thinking that there is great potential in the development of design 
features that serve to maintain a human’s sense of commitment to an interaction with a robot, 
then it would also be very useful to design robots that are able to assess a human’s sense of 
commitment. This would enable them to increase commitment-generating signals in order to 
boost the human’s sense of commitment when necessary. Such an integrated approach should 
address the three modules that need to exist in a robot in order to succeed in dynamic 
interaction: perception, reasoning and action [82]. One starting point may be to measure pupil 
dilation as a means of assessing the human’s engagement in the task [83], although it is not 
yet clear how pupil dilation could be measured in such a way as to provide a sufficiently 
reliable measure in noisy real-world environments. In some contexts, it may be possible to 
measure the human’s gaze direction to assess her attention to task-relevant aspects of the 
situation [84]. A further possibility may be to harness software enabling face-based or voice-
based [85] emotion recognition: if the human’s emotion responses no longer track the 
progress of the task or reflect task-relevant events, this may be taken to indicate 
disengagement from the task [86].   
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